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Foreword
REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH* AND NICOLA SARTORI**
I. INTRODUCTION
In February, 2012, the Treasury and White House unveiled Presi-
dent Obama's Framework for Business Tax Reform. A major propo-
sal was to abolish the deferral on income earned by foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations ("CFCs"). The administration justi-
fied the proposal with an argument about competitiveness:
[I]ncome earned by subsidiaries of U.S. corporations operat-
ing abroad must be subject to a minimum rate of tax. This
would stop our tax system from generously rewarding com-
panies for moving profits offshore. Thus, foreign income de-
ferred in a low- tax jurisdiction would be subject to
immediate U.S. taxation up to the minimum tax rate with a
foreign tax credit allowed for income taxes on that income
paid to the host country. This minimum tax would be de-
signed to balance the need to stop rewarding tax havens and
to prevent a race to the bottom with the goal of keeping U.S.
companies on a level playing field with competitors when en-
gaged in activities which, by necessity, must occur in a for-
eign country.'
At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, Chairman David Camp of
the House Ways and Means Committee unveiled a proposal to almost
completely exempt the active income of a CFC, even when distributed
to the parent as a dividend. This proposal was also mostly justified by
competitiveness considerations. 2
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law and Director, International Tax LLM, the University
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I The President's Framework for Business Tax Reform 14 (2012), http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-
Reform-02-22-2012.pdf.
2 See Staff of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, Technical Explanation of the Ways
and Means Discussion Draft Provisions to Establish a Participation Exemption System for
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The debate about whether to abolish deferral or to adopt territorial-
ity has been going on ever since the Kennedy Administration first pro-
posed ending deferral in 1961. 3 But neither side has factual support
for their argument about whether the U.S. tax system, including sub-
part F, as currently enacted or with any of the proposed reforms, in
fact negatively impacts the tax burden of U.S.-based multinational en-
terprises (MNEs). Even the concept of competitiveness itself is un-
clear. Despite numerous claims,4 there has been no rigorous attempt
that we are aware of to determine whether MNEs based in our major
trading partners actually have a tax advantage or disadvantage be-
cause of subpart F or other tax rules.
In October, 2011, the American Tax Policy Institute sponsored a
conference organized by Reuven Avi-Yonah and Jane Gravelle on
"International Taxation and Competitiveness." This conference was
designed to address these issues in a systematic way, and to form the
basis for a better informed policy debate. The articles included in this
Issue were first presented at this conference. This Foreword summa-
rizes their main conclusions.
II. THE CONCEPT OF COMPETITIVENESS
In order to analyze the link between competitiveness and interna-
tional taxation, it is useful to delineate the concept(s) of competitive-
ness, which is a seldom defined but frequently used term (especially in
tax policy debates).
Economists use a broad, nation-wide concept of competitiveness in
order to make comparisons across nations, while they use a market-
oriented concept of competitiveness in order to make comparisons
among businesses and workers operating in different markets.
Michael Knoll argues that a market-oriented conception has several
advantages over a nation-wide conception in understanding how gov-
ernment policy affects competitiveness. 5 He notes that market-ori-
ented measures are "more closely aligned with our intuitions about
competitiveness" and "are capable of being given a more solid theo-
3 Federal Tax System-Message from the President of the United States, 107 Cong. Rec.
6456, 6458 (1961).
4 See, e.g., 1, pt. 1 Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, The NFTC Foreign Income Project:
International Tax Policy for the 21st Century 33-145 (2001), available at http://www.nftc.
org/default/tax/fip/NFTCla%20volumel-partl.pdf; id. at 310 ("The comparison of anti-
deferral rules in the NFTC Subpart F Report found that for every category of income
considered, the United States imposed the severest regime.").
5 Michael S. Knoll, The Connection Between Competitiveness and International Taxa-
tion, 65 Tax L. Rev. 349, 351 (2012).
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retical foundation because they can be integrated into standard eco-
nomic models."'6
Paul Krugman (cited by both Michael S. Knoll and Jane Gravelle) 7
has strongly criticized the idea of competitiveness as a characteristic of
an entire nation.8 Krugman argues that nations cannot be compared
to corporations because nations, unlike corporations, do not go out of
business; while firms compete, countries trade. 9 The United States
can be better off or worse off (rather than competitive). Thus the
term competitiveness should be associated with an industry rather
than a nation.
There are two main definitions of competitiveness, as applied to in-
dustries. Under the first definition, competitiveness focuses on the to-
tal output (both domestic and foreign) of the companies based in a
given jurisdiction. An industry is competitive in the United States if
U.S. multinationals have a strong ability to compete with foreign mul-
tinationals (both in domestic and foreign markets). The focus is on
the nationality of the producing company (regardless of the place of
production). As Knoll notes "the U.S. corporate income tax will ad-
versely affect the competitiveness of [a] U.S .... industry if it reduces
the incentive for U.S.-based [firms]-relative to their foreign competi-
tors-to own productive assets."' 10
Under the second definition, competitiveness focuses on the total
output of an industry regardless of the nationality of the producing
company. A U.S. industry is competitive if U.S. and foreign multina-
tionals invest in the United States, rather than in foreign countries.
The focus is on the U.S. production (regardless of the nationality of
the producing companies). Under this view, according to Knoll, the
U.S. corporate income tax affects the competitiveness of a U.S. indus-
try if it discourages investment in production in the United States rela-
tive to investment in production abroad.11
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Yaron Lahav believe that competitiveness
"is primarily about the ability of the largest U.S. multinationals to
compete with their counterparts based in other countries, and espe-
cially those based in the EU. '12 In other words, they adopt the first
6 Id.
7 Knoll, note 5, at 349 n.2; Jane Gravelle, Does the Concept of Competitiveness Have
Meaning in Formulating Corporate Tax Policy?, 65 Tax L. Rev. 323, 325 n.7 (2012).
8 Paul Krugman, Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, Foreign Aff., Mar./Apr.
1994, at 28.
9 Id. at 31.
10 Knoll, note 5, at 358.
11 Id. at 359.
12 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rates of the Largest U.S.
and EU Multinationals, 65 Tax L. Rev. 375, 377 (2012).
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definition of competitiveness, focusing on the ownership of productive
assets.
Brian Arnold also implicitly adopts the first definition of competi-
tiveness. His comparative review of CFC provisions responds to
claims that have been made that "U.S. multinationals are at a signifi-
cant competitive disadvantage compared to many foreign-based mul-
tinationals because the U.S. subpart F rules are broader and harsher
than the CFC rules of other capital-exporting countries. '13
Others seem to adopt both perspectives simultaneously. As Jane
Gravelle notes, 14 the report of the National Commission on Fiscal Re-
sponsibility and Reform includes language decrying the effect of the
Code on the ability of U.S. business to compete abroad as well as the
attractiveness of the United States for foreign investment.1 5 In its
concern for competitiveness, it is not clear whether the Commission
wanted more U.S.-owned operations abroad or wanted more foreign-
owned operations in the United States.
Finally, Eric Toder adopts an operational definition of competitive-
ness (which resembles the second definition rather than the first, but
is also close to a nation-wide notion), pointing out that countries com-
pete with other nations for labor supply, financial and physical capital,
intangible capital, tax revenues, and natural resources.1 6 In other
words, competitiveness, according to Toder, is "competition between
nations for scarce and mobile resources. ' 17 Following this definition,
taxation can affect the ability of countries to compete for workers,
capital, and investment opportunities.
III. COMPETITIVENESS AND THE NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
A second issue is the relationship of the two definitions of competi-
tiveness to the various neutrality principles of international taxation.
These neutrality concepts determine the tax treatment of cross-border
income.
Knoll shows that the first definition of competitiveness (U.S. mul-
tinationals competing with foreign multinationals) is consistent with
capital ownership neutrality (CON) or, alternatively, capital import
13 Brian J. Arnold, A Comparative Perspective on the U.S. Controlled Foreign Corpora-
tion Rules, 65 Tax L. Rev. 473, 473 (2012).
14 Gravelle, note 7, at 323 ns. 1, 2.
15 Nat'l Comm'n on Fiscal Responsibility & Reform, The Moment of Truth 29, 32
(2010), available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/docu-
ments/TheMomentofTruthl2-1-2010.pdf
16 Eric Toder, International Competitiveness: Who Competes Against Whom and for
What?, 65 Tax L. Rev. 505, 509 (2012).
17 Id. at 533.
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neutrality (CIN) when CIN is understood as ownership neutrality. "A
tax system that satisfies CON is one in which companies, regardless of
where they are based, compete on an equal footing in seeking to ac-
quire productive assets. Tax considerations will not advantage or dis-
advantage any of them in their ability to acquire productive assets. '18
Gravelle explains that territorial or source-based tax systems where
income is taxed only by the country in which it is earned satisfy the
CIN standard because each firm in a location faces the same tax
rate.19
The second definition (United States competing with other coun-
tries for providing labor and capital to multinationals) is consistent
with capital export neutrality (CEN).20 "An international tax regime
that satisfies CEN (that is, universal adoption of worldwide taxation
with unlimited foreign tax credits) will place all states on an equal
footing in their ability to attract foreign investment. Tax considera-
tions will not advantage or disadvantage any of them in their ability to
attract investment. ' 21 As Gravelle points out, a system that imposes
taxes on residents on their worldwide income with an unlimited for-
eign tax credit and foreigners on their source income achieves CEN,
even though "the distribution of taxes is different, with more tax col-
lected by net capital importers than in a straightforward residence sys-
tem. '22 Gravelle also notes that a worldwide system residence-based
system with a deduction for foreign taxes "maximizes a country's wel-
fare because the rate of return received by the country (either in its
firms' profits or in its own taxes) is equal. '23
IV. THE STATE OF THE ART: EMPIRICAL DATA ON THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. MULTINATIONALS
Adopting the most common definition of competitiveness (at least
among the authors), tax rules affect competitiveness in the sense that
they affect the ability of U.S. multinationals to compete for invest-
ments and for people. Several authors investigated whether U.S. mul-
tinationals are actually at a competitive disadvantage compared with
foreign (mainly European and Japanese) multinationals in order to
test the veracity of competitiveness arguments made by U.S. multina-
tionals about the effect of U.S. tax rules.
18 Knoll, note 5, at 368.
19 Gravelle, note 7, at 329.
20 Knoll, note 5, at 364.
21 Id.
22 Gravelle, note 7, at 329.
23 Id. at 329-30.
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Although the United States has the second highest statutory corpo-
rate tax rate in the OECD, it is the effective tax rate that directly
affects U.S. competitiveness with other multinationals. Avi-Yonah
and Lahav studied the overall effective tax rates of the largest 100
U.S.-based multinationals and compared them to the 100 largest EU
multinationals. They conclude U.S.-based MNEs do not face a tax-
induced competitive disadvantage in competing against EU-based
MNEs.24 They found that although the U.S. statutory rate is ten per-
centage points higher than the average EU corporate statutory rate,
the effective U.S. corporate tax rate is the same or lower than the
effective EU corporate tax rate for largest U.S. and EU MNEs.25 Avi-
Yonah and Lahav believe this is because the European corporate tax
base is larger than U.S. corporate tax base due in part to tougher CFC
rules. Their comparison of the CFC rules of the United States and
major EU countries shows that the EU CFC rules tend to be more
stringent than subpart F because they use the effective tax rate in the
source country in determining whether to tax CFC income and they
take into account whether the CFC has a real presence in the source
country.
26
Arnold undertakes a comparative analysis that confirms this suppo-
sition. He compares the CFC legislation of nine different countries,
27
and concludes that "the U.S. subpart F rules are not noticeably
broader than the CFC rules of other countries, with the exception per-
haps of the slightly broader concept of base company income under
the U.S. rules. ' 28
An analysis by Melissa Costa and Jennifer Gravelle also suggests
that the popular conclusion that U.S. taxes impede the ability of U.S.
MNEs to compete does not withstand analysis.29 They provide esti-
mates of the average tax rates of U.S. CFCs by industry and updated
estimates of U.S. average tax rates on foreign and domestic income of
multinational corporations. An important contribution of their work
is that their measure of average tax rates addresses the impact of
deferral on the rate assessed on the total foreign income of MNEs.
They show that although a significant amount of foreign income is
subject to U.S. tax, the ability to defer taxes on foreign income cou-
24 Avi-Yonah & Lahav, note 12, at 383.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 384.
27 For another comparative analysis of CFC legislation, see Reuven Avi-Yonah & Nicola
Sartori, U.S. Sub-part F Legislative Proposals: A Comparative Perspective, 5 Int'l Tax'n
428-37 (2011).
28 Arnold, note 13, at 496.
29 Melissa Costa & Jennifer Gravelle, Taxing Multinational Corporations: Average Tax
Rates, 65 Tax L. Rev. 391, 408 (2012).
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pled with low average foreign rates on CFC income suggests that the
U.S. tax system has strong territorial features, with a nominal residual
average tax on foreign earnings.30 Their conclusion is that "U.S. cor-
porations are likely not being negatively impacted by the U.S. corpo-
rate tax rate.
'31
As Toder notes, nations compete for various resources, one of
which is labor supply.32 Thus, one way in which corporate taxes might
affect competitiveness is if they have an effect on labor supply.
Kimberly Clausing's study reviewed the effects of corporate taxation
on labor. Contrary to most studies she found that although "some
evidence suggests that corporate taxation may lower wages . . . the
preponderance of evidence does not suggest any wage effects from
corporate taxation. ' 33 She notes that corporate tax incidence is very
hard to model and speculates that there are a number of possible ex-
planations for the difference in results among the studies. For exam-
ple, while corporate taxes may discourage some investments, they may
not have a large enough effect on overall investment to substantially
reduce wages. 34 Another possibility is that the tax burden may fall
predominately on economic profits, which would reduce the rents of
shareholders and others who share their rents.
35
These articles suggest that the argument that U.S. corporate tax
rules make U.S. MNEs less competitive in foreign markets compared
with European and Japanese MNEs is generally wrong.
The statutory tax rates that multinational corporations are subject
to vary from the effective rates because MNEs are able to utilize vari-
ous mechanisms to lower their worldwide corporate income taxes.
Kevin Markle and Douglas Shackelford explore the extent to which
MNEs use leverage, intangibles, and tax havens to accomplish that,
testing for correlations between effective tax rates and these instru-
ments. 36 They find strong evidence that many multinationals use all
three avoidance methods.37 Their conclusion is that compared to for-
eign firms, U.S. multinationals appear to use debt to avoid taxes more
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Toder, note 16, at 509.




36 Kevin S. Markle & Douglas A. Shackelford, Cross-Country Comparisons of the Ef-
fects of Leverage, Intangible Assets, and Tax Havens on Corporate Income Taxes, 65 Tax
L. Rev. 415, 415 (2012).
37 Id. at 431.
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than firms in other countries but do not exploit intangibles and havens
as much.
38
V. TERRITORIAL VS. WORLDWIDE BASED TAXATION
AND COMPETITIVENESS
Depending on the definition of competitiveness adopted, it is possi-
ble to argue in favor of territorial or worldwide taxation principles.
Several articles considered the argument made by some scholars
that the U.S. tax system should move from worldwide taxation to ter-
ritoriality in order to facilitate the ability of U.S. corporations to com-
pete abroad.
Toder posits that a revenue-neutral tax reform that lowered the cor-
porate tax rate, broadened the base, and adopted a territorial system
would improve the competitiveness of U.S. MNEs (first definition of
competitiveness), but would raise the cost of investing in the United
States (second definition).39 In other words, territoriality would help
U.S. MNEs to compete with foreign MNEs, but would also have a
negative impact on the capability of the United States to attract
investment.
Conversely, Toder points out that a reform that lowered corporate
tax rates, broadened the base, and eliminated deferral would make
U.S.-based MNEs less competitive, but would reduce the cost of in-
vesting in the United States. 40 In other words, pure residence taxation
would increase the ability of the United States to attract investment,
but would reduce the ability of U.S. MNEs to compete with foreign
multinationals.
Jane Gravelle (who adopts the first definition of competitiveness)
argues that territorial taxation is inefficient because it results in the
relative after-tax returns being higher in a low-tax country and thus
capital will flow into those jurisdictions. The pretax return will then
rise in high-tax countries as capital becomes less abundant, will fall in
zero-tax countries as capital becomes more abundant, and could ei-
ther rise or fall in low-tax countries. This capital shift will continue
until after-tax returns are the same in all jurisdictions. 41 Her conclu-
sion is that "firms still compete in every location but the capital-labor
ratios are distorted and the outcome is inefficient. '42 In her opinion,
actions taken in the name of competitiveness have undermined sub-
38 Id.
39 Toder, note 16, at 533.
40 Id.
41 Gravelle, note 7, at 336.
42 Id.
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part F and have enabled profit shifting from high-tax jurisdictions to
low-tax jurisdictions.
43
VI. REDUCTION OF CORPORATE TAX RATES, TAX CUTS,
AND OTHER POSSIBLE REFORMS
Those who are concerned with competitiveness often argue that cer-
tain reforms of the U.S. international tax system are desirable. Others
support specific reforms in part because they would not affect the
competitiveness of U.S. MNEs.
Avi-Yonah and Lahav, for example, conclude that the United States
could reduce its corporate tax rate to the EU average in a revenue
neutral way without affecting the competitiveness of U.S.-based mul-
tinationals.4 4 They point out that many observers have noted that it
should be possible to abolish deferral if the U.S. rate were reduced
sufficiently. 45 "Such a move would have tremendous simplification
potential since it would be possible to get rid of both subpart F and
outbound transfer pricing enforcement, and it would eliminate the
'lock out' problem as well. .. 46 Alternatively, they suggest that it
should be possible to alter subpart F to take the source country rate
into account.
47
Toder analyzes the most important effects on competitiveness of
five tax cuts that might be part of any reform proposal. He concludes
that a cut in the marginal personal income tax rate would have the
most direct effect on increasing competitiveness for skilled and inter-
nationally mobile workers. 48 Choice of residence for wealthy individ-
uals would be affected most by a change in the rate of taxes on capital
gains and dividends as well as the estate tax, although these effects
might be negligible.4 9 Cuts in the effective marginal tax rate on new
corporate investments would have the most direct effect on capital
invested in the United States but only if they are not accompanied by
offsetting base broadening.
50
A decrease in the taxation of foreign source income would reduce in-
vestment in the United States by giving U.S. multinationals an incen-
tive to increase investment abroad. That might be offset, however, if
that capital outflow raised pretax returns in the United States and re-
sulted in an inflow of investment from foreign-based multinationals.
43 Id. at 347.




48 Toder, note 16, at 526.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 527.
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Bret Wells and Cym Lowell review the post-World War I interna-
tional tax policy debates in order to determine how the United States
got in a position where its international tax system was so flawed.51
They argue that the foundational premise that the residency country
should be allowed to tax residual income coupled with inappropriate
transfer pricing approaches resulted in the development of base-ero-
sion techniques that created untaxed "homeless income. '52 To re-
verse this result, they propose that a base-protecting surtax be
adopted. They call for revision of domestic transfer pricing principles
to require that cross-border payments from a U.S. payor to a foreign
entity be subject to the tax unless the U.S. payor reaches agreement
with the IRS that a lower or no surtax is required, which they call a
"base clearance certificate. '5 3 This procedure would evaluate the
global income of the foreign entity and the U.S. payor, taking into
account the overall business and the functions and risks performed in
the United States by the U.S. payor.5 4 They argue that their proposal
would achieve broadly embraced policy objectives and would enhance
international tax policy reform proposals currently on the table.
VII. CONCLUSION
In summary, the major conclusions of the articles in this Issue are as
follows:
" The concept of competitiveness is unclear and it is an open ques-
tion whether it is useful as a metric for determining U.S. interna-
tional tax policy.
" There is no good empirical evidence supporting the view that cur-
rent U.S. tax law adversely affects the competitiveness of U.S.-
based MNEs.
" The CFC rules of our major trading partners are not significantly
less onerous than subpart F.
In our opinion, this means that competitiveness should not be a ma-
jor consideration in reforming U.S. international tax policy. Other
considerations, such as the various neutralities (CEN, CIN, CON) and
the impact of tax rules on actual behavior by U.S.-based MNEs (for
example, the decision whether to repatriate income) and on whether
future MNEs will be based in the United States are more important.
51 Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at
Source Is the Linchpin, 65 Tax L. Rev. 535 (2012).
52 Id. at 538.
53 Id. at 539.
54 Id.
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